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NoTEs
NON-INJURIOUS ESTABLISHMENTS OF RELIGION
The Supreme Court of the United States recently revitalized the
public sentiment surrounding the question: At what point should the
line between permissible and impermissible church-state arrangements
be drawn? In Engel v Vitale' the constitutionality of allowing a
twenty-two word officially composed prayer to be read by the teacher
at the commercement of each public school day was challenged by
the parents of five children attending schools where the prayer was
recited. The parents sought the overturning of thq order of the school
board, which authorized the prayer, because of alleged compulsion in
the program. The Supreme Court expressly renounced this ground for
decision and invalidated the prayer, despite the failure to show injury,
because the program violated the constitutional provision prohibiting
any law respecting an establishment of religion.
The public reaction to the Engel decision was heated and varied.
2
While those denouncing the decision may have appeared to its
supporters to have been improvidently impassioned, their adamant
dissent should not be ignored without critical analysis. ThIs dissent
demonstrates the possibility that the Supreme Court has augmented the
ever-difficult task of balancing satisfactorily the rights and interests of
the various segments of society. Can there be an establishment of
religion absent compulsion? Is Engel an instance? If so, what becomes
of the underlying philosophy of government upon which this country
was founded? These are the questions this note will consider.
The United States is a prime example of a government founded
and maintained under the social compact theory. The basic assumption
of our form of government is that a sovereign people gave to the
government such powers of sovereignty as were deemed necessary to
secure to the people the enjoyment of fundamental rights against any
tendency toward encroachment on the part of their fellow men and to
expedite interaction among the segments of society. From the very
nature of the compact, government represents the people, providing
for their immediate desires within the boundaries of their basie
commands expressed in the Constitution. From the nature of each
department of government is determined its function under the com-
pact. Essentially, the function of the legislative department is to
express as law the immediate will of the people; that of the executive
department is to enforce this immediate will against those who attempt
to circumvent it; and that of the judicial department is to prevent the
1870 U.S. 421 (1962).
2 See examples cited by Kurland, The Regents Prayer Case: "Full of Sound
And Fury, Signifying ", 1962 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1.
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imposition of this immediate will upon dissident members of society
when the consequence of its imposition would be the injury of persons
protected by the basic commands of the people.3 While the interplay
among the departments of government so conceived may fall short of
formal perfection, it is precise enough to provide practical operation.
In recognition of its function, the federal judiciary has implemented
rules governing the types of issues courts consider. Fundamentally,
courts consider only those issues which are justiciable in nature4 and
which arise out of a case or controversy between adverse parties5
litigated by one who has sustained a specific and measurable injury
sufficient to confer upon him the standing to sue.( The doctnne of
standing to sue is of particular significance in the present discourse. It
underscores injury as a primary requisite for the invocation of the
judicial power. This is completely understandable when related to
the goal of efficient interplay among the departments of government.
Only if some sort of absolutism, rather than social harmony and
necessity, were the cornerstone of our Constitution, would the chan-
nelling of judicial energies to the task of limiting injury-free actions
by the majority be explicable or even tolerable.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged the applicability of the
doctrine of standing to sue to the establishment clause in Doremus v
Board of Educ.7 There the Court dismissed an action challenging a
state statute providing for. Bible reading, because the child had
graduated, thereby eliminating the possibility of injury as a basis for
the parent's standing to sue. Even where the injury was substantial
enough to confer standing, the Court held there was no violation of
the establishment clause in Zorach v Clauson.8 In that case a state
released students from class to attend religious instructions off the school
grounds while students choosing not to be released attended study hall.
The majority opinion emphasized that no money was spent and no
compulsion was shown, and concluded that there was no violation of
the first amendment. The clear import of the majority opinions in
both Doremus and Zorach is that there must be a substantial injury
before there is a judicially cognizable violation of the establishment
clause.
3 See generally Vanderbilt, The Doctrine of the Separation of Powers (1953).4 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549
(1946).
5 United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 802 (1943); Muskrat v. United States,
219 U.S. 346 (1911), and cases cited therein.
6 Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S.
447 (1923).
7 342 U.S. 429 (1952).
8 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
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Pnor to the Engel decision, two other decisions of the Supreme
Court had dealt with the establishment clause and education. In
Everson v Board of Educ.,9 Justice Black spoke for the Court in up-
holding the reimbursement of parents of parochial school children for
funds spent for school bus fare, as a part of a general program of
reimbursement. In McCollum v Board of Educ.,10 Justice Black again
wrote the opinion of the Court, striking down the use of school
buildings for religious instruction dunng released time in the middle
of the school day. In both of these opinions, as well as in the one
he wrote for the Court in Engel, he professed his convinction that there
is an absolute, called "establishment", which the Constitution prohibits
regardless of injury. Whether other members of the Court share his
conviction is open to doubt despite the fact that he has written the
opinion of the Court in three out of the five cases to date. In Everson,
the government program was upheld, so acquiescence in Black's theory
of absolutism cannot be imputed to the concurring Justices. In
McCollum, the two Justices who concurred with Black also concurred
with Justice Frankfurter, whose stress was on compulsion rather than
absolutism.1 Engel was the first of Black's opinions where the issue of
compulsion supposedly was not before the Court. Indeed, justice
Douglas' concurring opinion in Engel urges that Everson be overruled
and that all official marks of recognition of religion be removed from
government, whether or not compulsion is involved.' 2 Nevertheless,
considering the background of Black's opinions in previous cases, it may
well be doubted that the justices who joined him in the majority
opinidn share Black's and Douglas' faith in absolutism in interpreting
the establishment clause. Rather, it is more probable to supposethat
the others assumed compulsion was present. This is particularly
plausible since the dissenting judges in the state court of appeals
treated the subject of compulsion at some length.' s
Whatever the true popularity of Black's absolutism may be among
other members of the Court, the net effect of his approach is to
render the establishment clause an oddity in the Bill of Rights, because
it makes it the only clause authorizing advisory opinions to uninjured
parties. The approach taken by the Court in Doremus and Zorach,
reqpinng proof of injury, is more desirable and consistent with our
9830 U.S. 1 (1947).
10 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
11338 U.S. 203, 212 (1948).
12370 U.S. 421, 437 (1962). Douglas attitude is difficult to understand
since he wrote the majority opinion in Zorach, upholding the church-state arrange-
ment involved there because of the lack of injury. Here he speaks as though
Everson, not Zorach poses the real obstacle to the result he wishes to reach.
i3 Engel v. Vitale, 10 N.Y.2d 174, 184, 218 N.Y.S.2d 659, 664 (1981).
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functional Constitution. The argument that the requirement of proof
of mury renders the establishment clause superfluous by merging its
prohibitions with those of the free exercise clause can yet be avoided.
Room remains for a distinction between the type of injury which may
be remedied by resorting to one of the two companion clauses. The
Court could easily distinguish between indirect interference with re-
ligious liberty, as by using tax money or public property for religious
purposes, and direct interference with religious belief. The former
would readily adapt itself to the contours of the establishment clause,
while the latter would be in keeping with traditional concepts of the
free exercise clause.
Conclusion
While the Engel case can be taken as another example of the
absolutism of Justice Black, it must be remembered that the other
members of the majority also must have had reasons for concurring in
the result reached. Perhaps Engel is a case in which some of the
Justices presumed the presence of compulsion, but declined to decide
on that ground because of a desire for unanimity of support for the
doctnne enunciated. On the other hand their reluctance may have
been due to a fear of the type of public disfavor encountered as a
result of Brown v Board of Educ.,'4 where the Court admittedly based
its integration decision on psychological compulsion. Whatever the
reasons, the result in Engel was reached by a route which leads neither
to symmetry in the law nor to harmony in society, and when the issue
comes up for re-examination at this term of Court,15 it is hoped that
the Court will face squarely the task of delineating the limits of the
establishment and free exercise clauses in a manner which is con-
stitutionally consistent and publicly palatable. Perhaps the same result
will be reached. If so, it should be only after full deliberation of the
real issue of compulsion.1"
Terrence R. Fitzgerald
14 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
15 School Dist. of Abmgton Township v. Schempp, 201 F Supp. 815, prob.
jurts. noted, 83 S.Ct. 25 (1962). Muraay v. Curlett, 228 Md. 239, 79 A.2d 698,
cert. granted, 83 S.Ct. 21 (19625.
16 For a fuller treatment of the topic of this note, published after tis was
written but before it was published, see Sutherland, Establishment According to
Engel, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 25- (1962).
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